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Public utilities1 providing gas, electric, water, and telephone service
have commonly exacted cash deposits2 or guarantees3 from some non-
business consumers4 as a condition of initiating service.5 Despite some
restrictions on the size of these deposits,0 in most states utility compan-
ies may legally demand substantial cash sums-often an amount equal
1. Private investor-owned companies dominate the utility field in the United States.
In 1967, privately owned electric companies generated approximately 75 per cent of all
kilowatt hours. MooDY'S PUBIC UTiLrrY MANUAL, Aug. 1968, at a16. The Bell Telephone
system in 1967 supplied service to 86,776,000 phones while independents, predominantly
privately owned, supplied an additional 17,276,000 phones. id. at a66. Municipal plants
and cooperatives do provide a small proportion of some types of utility service. Munici-
palities generated 5 per cent of total kilowatt hours in 1967 while cooperatives generated
1 per cent of total kilowatt hours. Id. a16.
2. Cash deposits must be distinguished from advance payments. Although both may
serve a similar function, cash deposits provide a reserve against which uncollected bills
may be deducted. Advance payments are prepayment for services to be rendered. Utility
regulations distinguish between these two payments. See e.g., Pennsylvania Pub. Ut.
Comm'n, Tariff Regulations § VII(l) (1946), which controls payment of rate in advance
of furnishing service, and § VII(2), which controls deposits.
Early common law decisions approved the exaction of deposits from utility customers.
See Collins v. Miami County Gas Co., 104 Kan. 735, 180 P. 769 (1919); Williams v. Mutual
Gas Co., 52 Mich. 499, 18 N.W. 236, 50 Am. Rep. 266 (1884); Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co. v.
Pawhuska, 47 Okla. 342, 148 P. 118 (1915). Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 6 Wis.
539, 70 Am. Dec. 479 (1858) (dictum).
3. Guarantees by the consumer or responsible individual may be accepted in lieu of a
cash deposit. E.g., Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order No. 1692 (Rules For Electrical
Service) § 14(b) (1944). "If the account is satisfactorily guaranteed, the form prepared by
the utility for such guaranty shall dearly state the maximum amount guaranteed, and
the utility shall not hold the quarantor responsible for any additional amount unless the
guarantor agrees to the same in writing."
4. This Note examines only the application of cash deposits to domestic accounts. Any
discussion of the application of cash deposits to business accounts raises issues separate
from those discussed here.
5. This Note examines only the requirement of deposits for service where lines of
distribution serve the customer. For a brief discussion of extensions see Note, Duty of a
Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, 62 COLUM, L. Rv.
312, 316-17 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Duty to Serve].
6. The limitations on deposit amounts are generally related to the length of the billing
period and time required to collect a bill. If the required deposit exceeds probable
charges for service during ordinary collection periods, the deposit may be considered
unreasonable. See e.g., Re Citizens Util. of Cal., 26 P.U.R.3d 219 (1958) (Calif. P.S.C.)
(proposed change in rules).
For presently promulgated tariffs and regulations, see, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., San
Francisco, Cal., Rule No. 7(A) (1957) (twice estimated average monthly bill but no less
than five dollars); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n § VII, 2(a) (1946) (estimated gross
bill for any single billing period plus one month); Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Common § 134.06
(1)(a) (2 consecutive billing periods); Washington Gas Light Co., Washington, D.C., Rate
Schedule and General Service Provisions for Gas Service (1968) (60 days). Vermont Pub.
Serv. Bd., General Order No. 43, § 6 (1965) (60 days estimated gas bill); Conn. Ad-
ministrative Regulations § 16-11-105(a) (1968) (90 days); N.J. Dept of Pub. Util.
§ 14.407-laa (deposit reasonably related to the probable charge during the billing and
collection period).
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to the customer's anticipated consumption for two or three months."
In practice the companies' deposit rules generally exempt higher in-
come consumers,8 and most of the deposits required are paid by low-
income users.9 Since the poor may often have difficulty accumulating
the necessary cash,'0 the deposit requirement may deprive people of
a basic necessity, not because they could not pay the utility's bills, but
because they could not raise the larger sum necessary for the deposit.
Even for those able to furnish a deposit, having their money held in-
definitely remains a serious inconvenience-if not a hardship.U The
legal interest which the utilities must pay on amounts deposited-'
7. The Southern Connecticut Gas Company of New Haven, Connecticut demands
from customers with unsatisfactory credit a minimum of $50.00 if gas is used for heating.
Interview with Mrs. F. DeAngelis, Service Representative, Southern Connecticut Gas Co.
of New Haven, Oct. 25, 1968.
A recent survey of a Washington, D.C. area revealed that 21 per cent of the 209
respondents paid cash deposits exceeding $25, with four in excess of $100. Complaint
filed Feb. 29, 1968, with Washington Public Service Commission for Winston C. Lewis
(on behalf of Neighborhood Advisory Council and Consumer Action Committee, Wash-
ington Urban League Neighborhood Development Center) in Lewis v. Washington Gas
Light Co., at 3-4 (1968), as amplified by telephone interview with Sarah Smith of
Neighborhood Advisory Council and Consumer Action Committee, Washington Urban
League, Oct. 29, 1968.
The actual breakdown of persons depositing sums in excess of $30: $150 (1 person);
$100-110 (3); $90-99 (I); $80-89 (3); $70-79 (5); $60-69 (3); $50-59 (2); $4049 (6); $30-39 (19).
Id. at 4.
8. Although no exhaustive study of this had been conducted, the Urban League
checked the more affluent areas of Washington, D.C. at random and discovered that
deposits were generally not required. Id. at 5.
Interview with H. Loomis, Revenue Div., Southern New England Telephone Company.
New Haven, Oct. 30, 1968, indicated that the credit checks conducted by the telephone
company before the imposition of deposits may result in residents of lower-income
areas being the only ones who are required to make deposits. These deposits, however,
reflect the credit standing of the particular applicants and not any conscious design to
demand deposits from all residents of low-income neighborhoods.
9. See p. 458 infra.
10. D. CAPLovriz, TBE PooR PAY MoRE, 109-12 (1967). In one survey, Caplovtz dis-
covered that 73 per cent of surveyed families have $100 or less in liquid assets. Id. 110.
An additional survey of the Washington, D.C. area revealed that 13 of 260 respondents
had been without gas following discontinuation of service for non-payment of a bill
because of their inability to accumulate cash to pay both the bill and deposit require-
ment. Complaint in Lewis v. Washington Gas Light Co., supra note 7, at 4-5. Four
different surveys were conducted. Interview with Mrs. Sarah Smith, supra note 7.
11. Some commissions require a refund of the deposit after a sufficient period of
trouble-free relations with the customer. Certain rules and regulations presume that
prompt payment to the utility for a certain time period demonstrates satisfactory credit
and requires refunds of deposits. N.J. Dept. of Pub. Util., § 14:407-la (shall review a
customer's account at least once every two years and if such review indicates that the
customer has established satisfactory credit the deposit shall be refunded). Even states
where the utility may initially demand a deposit from any customer have a comparable
rule. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, § VI12(b) (1946) (deposit returned when customer
has paid undisputed bills for 12 consecutive months).
Others are silent on this matter, e.g., Vermont Pub. Util. Comm'n, Gen. Order No. 43,
§ 6 (1965) (raises the possibility that the utility may retain the deposit until service is
terminated).
12. Utilities by common law decision were required to pay interest on the sums
deposited by customers, usually at rates between four and six per cent. Union Light,
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hardly compensates poor families since the interest rate offered may
be far below the rate that would induce voluntary saving. Thus,
requiring deposits from certain consumers means that utility service
is considerably more costly for them than for those consumers not
required to pay deposits.
By imposing these burdens, public utilities may not only discriminate
unreasonably and unlawfully among users,13 but also violate their
statutory duty to provide all consumers with adequate service on rea-
sonable terms.14 At the same time, the deposit requirements raise four-
teenth amendment questions of unequal treatment.",
I. Duty to Serve
Utilify companies argue that unless deposits are required in certain
cases, small uncollectible accounts-too costly to pursue through legal
processes' 6 -will raise the costs of utility operation and, consequently,
Heat & Power Co. v. Mulligan, 177 Ky. 662, 197 S.W. 1081 (1917). Cf. Collins v. Miami
County Gas Co., 104 Kan. 735, 180 P. 769 (1919).
Commission and utility rules govern the interest which must be credited. E.g., Wash-
ington Gas Light Co., General Service Provision § 3 (five per cent); Pennsylvania Pub.
Util. Comm'n, § V112(d) (six per cent). See Re Kalia Tel. Co., 55 P.U.R.3d 525 (1964)
(Ohio P.U.C.) (required to pay 32 per cent rather than no interest). Statutes also govern
interest rates. See note 15 infra.
Some cases suggest that interest payments legitimize the demand for a cash deposit:
e.g., "[t]he requirement that the company should pay interest u pon deposits is but the
compliment of the rule that it may require a deposit." Union Light, Heat 96 Power Co.
v. Mulligan, 177 Ky. 662, 670, 197 S.W. 1081, 1085 (1917); Community Natural Gas Co.
v. Moss, 55 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). But consumers have different conceptions
of what interest rates are required to forego current consumption.
13. E.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (West 1956); McKinney's N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law
§ 91(1) (McKinney 1955); R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-2-11 (1938). Wis. STAT. ANN. § 116.03(1)
(1957).
If a deposit rule is authorized by specific statutory authority, then presumably only
constitutional provisions can be utilized to attack the imposition of deposit require-
ments. Of course by statutory construction, the breadth of the particular statute may be
restricted by the broader general statutory duties imposed upon the utility. For ex-
ample, perhaps the statutory duty not to discriminate requires the reading of credit-
worthiness standard into a particular statute authorizing deposits. See N.Y. TRANSP. COIt,.
LAw § 13 (McKinney 1944).
In states which have statutes regulating a peripheral aspect of deposit requirements,
such as interest rates, tariff filings and commission regulations might still be invalidated
on statutory grounds. The assessment of interest rates and often criminal sanctions if the
corporation fails to pay interest to the consumer may imply that the legislature views
deposits as devices which must be circumscribed as much as possible. See ANN. LAws
MAss. ch. 158, § 16 (1959); Micir. Comp. LAws ANN. § 460.651 (1967) (interest), § 460.652
(1967) (repayment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 1211 (1967) (abandoned utility deposits).
14. E.g., CAL. PUB. UTiL. CODE § 453 (West 1956); N.Y. PuB. Sistv. LAW § 91(l)-(2)
(McKinney 1955); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 39-2-2 (1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 3196.22 (1957).
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
There may be dangers in employing constitutional safeguards in this area. Constitu-
tional arguments may fail to take account of the real economic problems involved in
striking down these practices. Indeed, it may be politically preferable to rely on legisla-
tive mandates to achieve this end.
16. Re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedure, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 439, 444
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increase the price of service.' 7 Although utilities can terminate service
if a bill remains unpaid for more than a relatively short time,", they
have contended that the threat of termination alone does not ade-
quately deter or protect against consumer defaults.' 9 Regulatory com-
missions and courts have, therefore, approved deposit requirements
on the ground that the cost of bad accounts would otherwise fall on
customers who pay their bills promptly.
20
Many, if not most, businesses, however, write bad debts off as a busi-
ness expense and pass the cost on to their customers. It is true, of course,
that utilities must deal with all consumers served by their facilities and
cannot screen their customers. But the utility companies have govern-
ment-guaranteed monopolies, and in the absence of competition, only
commissions or courts can monitor their discriminatory policies or hid-
den charges. Few people, and particularly few poor people, can forego
utility service to avoid being overcharged. Finally, the fact that requir-
ing substantial deposits puts utility service out of some people's reach
altogether ought to be balanced against the economic needs of the util-
ity. The utilities' deposit requirements should, therefore, be carefully
measured against the utilities' duty to serve the public on reasonable
terms.
(1935) (Wis. P.U.C.); Short v. Baltimore Gas 9- Elec. Co., 63 P.U.R.Sd 493, 496 (1966) (Md.
P.S.C.). In Berner v. Interstate Power Co., 244 Iowa 298, 301-02. 57 N.W-2d 55. 56.57
(1953), the court recognized that utilities needed protection in addition to usual collection
practices.
17. See note 16 supra. "Filing of a deposit rule will make it possible for the company
to minimize delinquent accounts and reduce the number of applications of a reconnection
charge." Re Arena & R. Tel. Co., 68 P.U.R. (n.s.) 146, 148 (1947) (Wis. P.S.C.). See also
Manhattan Reporting Bureau, Inc. v. New York Tel. Co., 1926B P.U.R. 1, 3 (N.Y. P.S.C.).
18. E.g., Washington Gas Light Co., Gen. Serv. Provision § 9(b) (failure to pay within
20 days after rendition of bill--5 days written notice to customer); Conn. Regs. § 16-11-
38(b) (discontinue service after diligent effort to collect-7 days written notice); Vermont
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Gen. Order No. 43, 11, B(1) (following expiration of grace period
provided customer given 5 day written notice); Michigan Standards of Gas Service § 33
(revised 1944) (10 days after expiration of discount period-5 da)s after written notice).
In order to ensure that the cash deposit remains intact, discontinuation of service has
been authorized even if the deposit exceeds the consumer's indebtedness. Pilger v.
Abington Elec. Co., 6 P.U.R. (ns.) 374, 377-78 (1934) (Pa. P.S.C.) (the company acted
within its rights in discontinuing service because if the bill were paid out of the deposit,
then the consumer would be required to make up the difference and service could be
discontinued for failure to do so). Hicks v. Carolina Power & Light Co.. 175 S.C. 350. 179
S.E. 322 (1935); Community National Gas Co. v. Moss, 55 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932) (inures to the benefit of the company primarily and tie company is entitled to
require it be kept intact).
19. Re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procsdure. 11 P.U.R. (i.s.) 439. 444
(1935) (AVis. P.S.C.) (recognizing right of disconnection as extia-leg.Il tlcic a% well as
deposit); Short v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 63 P.U.R.3d 493 (196) (Md. P.S.C.) (allowing
an internal rule governing disconnection but also recognizing the utilit)'s right to demand
a deposit).
20. Community Natural Gas Co. v. Moss, 55 S.W-2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (if
exhaustion of deposit allowed, then consumer who paid his bills would be disciiminatwd
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Official scrutiny of these practices, in fact, has not been adequate.
Utilities regulated by public service commissions21 generally must file
tariffs outlining their deposit practices and, of course, comply with
whatever statutoryf and commission provisions23 exist on the subject.
In addition, in states which permit utilities to exact deposits only from
customers with "unsatisfactory" credit,24 the commission may review a
company's initial assessment of an applicant's credit.26 Neither the com-
missions nor the courts which oversee them,20 however, have proved
willing to find the demand for a deposit from a particular applicant
arbitrary or unreasonable so long as the utility has acted in apparent
good faith and in line with an appropriately filed deposit rule.27 Courts
against); Short v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 63 P.U.R.3d 493 (1966) (Md. P.S.C.); Re
Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedures, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 439 (1935) (WIs.
P.S.C.); Manhattan Reporting Bureau, Inc. v. New York Elec. Co., 1926B P.U.R. 1, 3
(N.Y. P.S.C.).
21. In 1964, state commissions exercised jurisdiction over telephone companies In 49
of 50 states, gas companies in 47 of 50 states, and electric companies in 46 of 50 states.
C. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 91 (1965) [hereinafter cited as PmutL's].
The District of Columbia also regulates gas, electric, and telephone companies.
22. Certain states have legislated explicitly on the subject of deposits: e.g., N.Y. TRANSP.
CoRP,. LAw § 13 (McKinney 1943); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4933.17 (Page 1954). Other
regulations or tariff rules must comply with general statutory duties imposed on utilities.
See text infra. Soloman v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 61 P.U.R. (n.s.) 525 (1945) (Cal. Rail-
road Comm'n).
23. Raytown Chamber of Commerce v. Central Dist. Co., 46 P.U.R. (n.s.) 65 (19,2)
(Mo. P.S.C.); Re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedures, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 439
(1935) (Wis. P.S.C.); Re Public Serv. Co., 1918A P.U.R. 823 (Ill. P.U.C.) (allowed con.
tinuation of present deposit rule until able to promulgate a new one).
As for general regulations promulgated by a commission, see N.J. Dillmer Transfer
Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 186 Pa. Super. 526, 142 A.2d 419 (1958). See, e.g.,
Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order No. 1692 (Rules for Electrical Service-Revision of
1944) § 4. Of course, the commission regulations cannot be inconsistent with applicable
statutory enactments.
24. See note 49 infra, outlining the burden of proof placed on customers. This func-
tion of reviewing the credit rating of the customer has been considered a managerial
function with which the commission is reluctant to interfere. See Re Guarantee &
Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedure, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 439 (1935) (Wis. P.S.C.).
25. Complaints from consumers may be handled informally and formally. 'iuLU.us
137-42; P. GARFIELD & IV. LovEjoy, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONozIcs 37 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as GARFIELD]. Formal complaints are governed by statutory requirements of notice,
written decisions, and other procedural safeguards. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAr. ANN. § 16.13
(1958).
26. Judicial review of commission decisions is limited to certain courts by state
statutes and the scope of review may be limited as well, but in practice state courts have
not been reluctant to intervene in commission decisions. See Joslin & Miller, Public
Utility Rate Regulation: a Re-Examination, 43 VA. L. REv. 1027, 1032 (1957); see also
GARFIELD 40-43.
State courts have treated the question of commission primary jurisdiction differently.
Compare Steele v. Clinton, 123 Conn. 180, 193 A. 613 (1937), with Jacob Goodman & Co.
v. New York Tel. Co., 285 App. Div. 404, 137 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1955).
27. Compare Carpenter v. Home Tel. Co., 122 Vt. 50, 163 A.2d 838 (1961); Underwood
v. Southern Cities Distrib. Co., 157 So. 160 (La. App. 1934); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.
v. Bateman, 223 Ark. 432, 266 SAV.2d 289 (1954); Treadway v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 196
Ark. 174, 120 SAV.2d 378 (1938); Pilger v. Abington Elec. Co., 6 P.U.R. (n.s.) 374 (Pa.
P.S.C.), with McCormick v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 26 P.U.R.3d 366 (1958) (Wis. P.S.C.) (not
allowing enforcement of the deposit rule because of a misunderstanding on the part of
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and commissions have seemed no more eager to question the reason-
ability of the deposit rules themselves, or to consider whether they
breach the utility's duty to serve the public.2 8
Requiring consumer deposits is sensible only if it actually deters
defaults or minimizes losses for the utility company-something which
the companies have not yet convincingly shown.2 9 If deposits do not
save utilities and their customers money, they are neither necessary nor
reasonable. Even if the utilities can demonstrate that the practice of
exacting deposits does serve its stated purposes, the commissions
should then determine whether the resulting economies justify a reser-
vation on the utilities' duty to serve. In Berner v. Interstate Power
Company, the Iowa Supreme Court declared a utility might adopt
rules that balance "the necessity that people be provided service
against the right of the utility to receive fair compensation for services
rendered... ,"30 but held unreasonable a rule authorizing disconnec-
tion of service for a past-due account at another location.l
Other courts and commissions have fashioned similar procedurala 2
and substantive rules 33 which circumscribe a utility company's freedom
the consumer; however, customer required to tender payment of "28.19 in prior inlebted.
ness); Reese Chesapeake Tel. Co., 97 P.U.R. (n.s.) 29 (1952) (Ohio P.U.C.).
If the rule itself is unreasonable or discriminatory or employed in bad faith, then the
complainant will be awarded remedies. Barriger v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.. 19 Ky.
268, 244 SAV. 690 (1922) (discriminatory application); Phelan v. Boone Gas Co., 147 Iowa
626, 2 NA. 208 (1910) (bad faith on the part of the utility). See Re Plentywood Elec.
Co., 1930C P.U.R. 676 (Mont. P.S.C.) (where flat $5.00 deposit did not reflect actual costs).
If no rules are filed, then enforcement of a deposit may be arbitrary and unreasonable.
See note 2 supra.
Of course, commissions may be striking down man) arbitrary exactions of utilities in
informal hearings, and cases which reach the formal hearing stage may reflect unrea-
sonable demands by a customer.
28. E.g., State v. Clinton Elec. Light 8- Power Co., 123 Conn. 180, 193 A. 613 (1937);
Berner v. Interstate Power Co., 244 Iowa 298, 57 N.W.2d (1953); Huff v. Elec. Power
Plant Bd. of Monticello, 29 SAV.2d 817 (Ky. 1957); Bartman v. Wisconsin Mid. Power
Co., 214 Wis. 608, 254 NAV. 376 (1934) (where customer tampering with meter the
utility may refuse to furnish service unless paid for costs of tampering).
Categories for which a utility may cease service according to an appropriately filed
tariff include: (1) refusals of customers to pay for services; (2) attempts to evade payment
or stealing of services; (3) using service for unlawful purposes; (4) annoying other patrons;
(5) interfering with or destroying service facilities; and (6) violating senice regulations.
F. IVFrcH, CAsES AND TEXr ON PuBLIc UTmrry REGULATION 190-219 (rev. ed. 1961).
Duty to Serve, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 312, 323 (1962), states that "notwithstanding a
utility's duty to serve the public a variety of circumstances may justify a refusal to
serve particular individuals. The duty to serve is not absolute, and it is only reasonable
that abuse of the right to serve should result in a loss of the right."
29. See note 67 infra.
30. 244 Iowa 298, 301, 57 N.W.2d 55 (1953). Prior to 1963, the Iowa Commerce Coon-
mission lacked rate making power over utilities providing services in cities and towns.
See IowA CODE ANN. § 490A1 (1963). Of necessity, the courts took an active hand in
controlling certain utility practices.
31. 244 Iowa 298, 303.
32. See note 35 infra for examples of procedural protection.
33. See pp. 454-55 infra. Indeed utilities have been forced to extend services to areas
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to undercut service for the sake of revenues. For example, despite the
commercial desirability of immediately discontinuing service when a
customer has missed the due date on a bill, both commissions and legis-
latures have required such procedural safeguards, such as written notice
to the customer, before the utility may shut off his service.
34 Some
courts and commissions have prohibited the termination of service
based on debts owed the utility for different services or merchandise,
8 5
for service at another location,80 or for service to another member of
the household.37 Utilities may also be required to provide service as
long as the customer pays current bills, notwithstanding unpaid past
bills.38 Judicial treatment of these cases may simply reflect "the legalis-
tic view that regards each contract as separate and distinct,"
80 but it
which offer lower rates of returns than present service areas. Lakewood Township v.
Lakewood Water Co., 29 N.J. Super. 422, 102 A.2d 671 (1954). But see Ccdar Island
Improvement Ass'n v. Clinton Elec. Light & Power Co., 4 P.U.R.3d 65 (1954) (Conn.
P.S.C.). Although the utilities cannot be deprived of their property without due process
of law, there is a zone of reasonableness in rates of returns. New England Tel. F4 Tel.
Co. of New Hampshire v. State, 104 N.H. 229, 183 A.2d 237 (1962); Wisconsin Tel. Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 232 Wis. 274, 287 N.W. 122 (1939).
34. General written notification must precede disconnection. See note 18 supra for
examples of time periods involved.
Some courts have construed procedural rules strictly against the utility. In Brewer V.
Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 33 Misc. 2d 1015, 228 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1962), the court
required the company to adhere strictly to the statutory requirements governing the
discontinuation of service. In Sokol v. Public Util. Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d 247, 53 Cal. Rptr.
673, 418 P.2d 265 (1966), the court required that a warrant be issued before telephone
service could be summarily disconnected because of alleged illegal activities. See Note,
55 CALiF. L. REv. 566 (1967); Note, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 773 (1967); Note, 20 STAt. L. Rnv.
136 (1967); Note, 12 VILL. L. REv. 661 (1967).
35. LaNasa v. New Orleans Sewerage & Water Bd., 249 La. 197, 184 So. 2d 622 (1966);
Garner v. City of Aurora, 149 Neb. 295, 30 N.W.2d 917 (1948); Miller v. Roswell Gas
& Elec. Co., 22 N.M. 594, 166 P. 1177 (1917); Ashline v. Public Elec. Light Co., 114 Vt.
301, 44 A.2d 164 (1945); Re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedures, 11
P.U.R. (n.s.) 439 (1935) (Wis. P.S.C.).
Current Conn. Regs., § 16-11-109 (1968), bar denial of service for (1) failure to pay
service by former occupant of premises; (2) failure to pay for merchandise purchased;
(3) failure to pay for different type or class of service; (4) failure to pay a bill as
guarantor of another; (5) failure to pay because of an inaccurate meter; (6) failure to
pay an estimated bill. The utilities are presumably allowed to discontinue service If an
outstanding bill exists for the same type and class of service at any location.
36. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 123 Tex. 157, 70 S.W.2d 413 (1934);
Luffy v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 5 P.U.R. (n.s.) 242 (1934) (Pa. P.S.C.); Re
Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedures, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 439 (1935) (Wis.
P.S.C.); Berner v. Interstate Power Co., 244 Iowa 298, 57 N.W.2d 55 (1953); but see Dwor-
man v. Consolidated Edison Co., 49 Misc. 2d 204, 267 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1965), rev'd, 26 App.
Div. 2d 535, 271 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1966); Sulkin v. Brooklyn Edison Co., 145 Misc. 484, 261
N.Y.S. 245, afl'd, 237 App. Div. 850 (1932).
37. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hobart, 89 Miss. 252, 42 So. 349 (1906) (wife's
arrears); Hochheim v. Cortland Tel. Co., 1933E P.U.R. 449 (husband) (Neb. State
Railway Comm'n 1957); cf. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Bateman, 223 Ark. 432,
266 S.W.2d 289 (1954) (husband).
38. Re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Discount Procedures, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 439 (1935)
(Wis. P.S.C.); cf. Public Util. Comm'n v. Camden & Rockland Water Co., 7 P.U.R. (ns.)
232 (1935) (Me. P.U.C.) (city guaranteed future payment if water was restored).
39. Duty to Serve 327. See Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 123 Tex. 157, 70
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seems far more likely that the courts took into account the necessity of
the utilities' services40 and the danger that utilities were exploiting the
governmental grant of monopoly power4' in making these demands.
Moreover, public utilities have available other less drastic remedies
to protect themselves against defaulting customers. For serious credit
risks, the companies could add a small amount to the monthly bills to
insure against later defaults. Alternatively, these customers could be
billed on a weekly basis,42 or the utility could require prepayment for
part of the service.43 Finally-and perhaps more fairly-the utilities
could spread the cost of bad accounts among all of its customers, as
most businesses do. Any of these alternatives will necessarily raise the
cost of utility service to those assessed the additional charges. Further-
more, if these charges were restricted to customers without a good
credit rating, some of the poorest consumers who are not good credit
risks might find themselves subsidizing those who default frequently,
such as transients. For the poor these added costs might prove as much
of a barrier to obtaining utility service as the present deposit require-
ments. A consumer might, of course, be permitted to choose between
a deposit and an insurance premium.
Of course, the utilities must still demonstrate the need for any of
these devices; and it is not yet dear what the magnitude of the added
charges would be, or whether utilities could draw defensible distinc-
tions among their customers to justify imposing charges on some but
not on others. Intelligent appraisal of these alternatives will depend on
the readiness of the courts and commissions to compel utilities to pro-
duce the necessary data on the default rates and the amounts of the
defaults for different classes of customers.
S.V.2d 413 (1934) (dictum); Luffy v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 5 P.U.R. (ns.) 242(1934); Berner v. Interstate Power Co., 244 Iowa 298, 57 N.W.2d 55 (1953); Miller v.
Roswell Gas & Electric Co., 22 N.M. 594, 166 P. 1177 (1917).
40. Cf. Public Util. Comm'n v. Camden & Rockland Water Co., 7 P.U.R. (n.s.) 232(1935) (Afe. P.U.C.); Whitsett v. City of St. Clair, 80 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. App. 1935); Hatch
v. Consumers Co., 17 Idaho 204, 104 P. 670 (1909).
41. "Monopolistic power run rampant is repugnant to the basic tenets of our sodety.
A fortiori is this true of a utility company which by its very nature vitally affects thepublic interest and which occupies its monopolistic status by virtue of governmental
franchise." Dworman v. Consolidated Edison Co., 49 Misc. 2d 204, 205, 267 N.Y.S.2d 291,
292 (1965), rev'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 535, 271 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1966). See also note 46 infra. Cf.Brewer v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 33 Misc. 2d 1015, 228 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1952); Re
Guarantee & Disconnect Rules, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 439 (1935) (Wis. P.S.C.).
42. In Wisconsin, the public utility commission has issued regulations permitting
weekly billing, but it is not mandatory. Wis. Aim . CODE § 134.06(3)(a).
43. Some utilities-notably telephone companies-already require prepayment of some
of the price of service.
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II. Discrimination
Even if the deposit requirement is not in itself an unreasonable con-
dition of providing service, the methods by which utilities determine
who must pay a deposit may amount to unlawful discrimination in
service under state utility laws.
4 4 Of course, not all discrimination is
forbidden, and a utility is free to treat one class of users differently
from another if there is adequate justification for doing so.'
1 It is
usually not enough, however, that one group will tolerate a higher
charge or that the utility wants to outbid a competitor for the
patronage of another group.4 6 For most cases of discrimination, the
company must justify its action by some difference in the value of the
service to the customer or in the cost of supplying service to him.
47
While some jurisdictions allow a public utility to demand a deposit
from any user, 48 most states-by statute or regulation-prohibit exac-
44. The Wisconsin Public Service Commission, perhaps the only commission to addiess
this issue directly, declared that regulations allowing the utility discretion to rcqulre
deposits according to credit-standing did not unreasonably discriminate among customers.
Re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedures, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 139 (1935) (Wis.
P.S.C.).
45. Arkansas Nat'l Gas Co. v. Norton Co., 165 Ark. 172, 263 S.W. 775 (1924) (a distinc-
tion may be made between different classes of consumers on account of location, anotunt
of consumption or other material condition which distinguish them from each other);
Northern Ill. Water Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 33 Il1. 2d 580, 213 N.E.2d 
274
(1965) (considering whether there were justifiable reasons for differentiating rates 
on
the basis of the existence of common hallways); Boston Real Estate Bd. v. Department 
of
Pub. Util., 334 Mass. 477, 136 N.E.2d 243 (1956) (different treatment for different 
classes
of customer, reasonably classified, is not unlawful discrimination is axiomatic in 
rate-
making).
46. See note 45 supra. Commissions have allowed lower rates in certain circumstanceq
where competition threatens the loss of revenues. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 22 P.U.R.3d 209,
211-12 (1958) (Cal. P.U.C.) (but the lower rates cannot be subsidized by 
charges to
customers outside the affected area); Re Cal. Elec. Power Co., 23 P.U.R.3d 275, 290 
(1958)
(Calif. P.U.C.) (lost revenues due to reduced rates must be borne by the stockholders).
47. There is a range of reasonableness within which rates for particular 
classes of
service may lie. The minimum is the incremental cost of service plus some contribution
to fixed costs, while the maximum equals the value of service for the particular 
class of
customers (however value of service is defined). GARFIELD 138-40. Yet commissions treat
the establishment of rates within the range of reasonableness quite differently. The 
Wis.
consin Public Service Commission demarked value of service as the upper 
bound to
which costs could be apportioned. Re Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 51 P.U.R. 
(n.s.) 299, 310
(1943) (Wis. P.S.C.). The Virginia Commission declared that cost was an 
etement to be
considered in rate making but that because drawing distinctions among customers 
on
the basis of costs was difficult and because no evidence as to costs was presented, 
It would
rely on the value of service. Re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 225, 239 (1955).
In one Connecticut case, the court admitted that no single rule could be utilized 
to
determine rates but that "rates must not be so low as to be confiscatory 
or so high as
to exceed the value of service to the consumer." Noroton Water Co. v. 
Public Utll.
Comm'n, 24 Conn. Supp. 441, 445, 193 A.2d 724, 726 (Super. Ct. 1962). This 
middle of
the road approach seems to indicate the arbitrariness of much rate-making.
48. Vermont Pub. Serv. Comm'n, General Order No. 43 (1965). Pennsylvania 
Pub. Utill.
Comm'n, Tariff Regulations, § VII (1952), mentions no credit standard to 
be applied
when the applicant applies (12 months of service experience allows refund 
of leposi-t; see
note 11 supra). For a discussion of the application of the Vermont rule, see 
Carpenter v.
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tion of deposits from consumers with "satisfactory credit." 40 Although
this requirement makes a certain amount of discrimination unavoidable
and, by strong implication, lawful, it also recognizes that payment of a
deposit is a hardship and that it should be required only when neces-
sary. In states which require creditworthiness, a customer can in theory
always demonstrate his good credit and exempt himself from the de-
posit requirement, which might suggest that the requirement is im-
partially administered. But for the poor, ignorant of their rights and
unable to afford the assistance necessary to prosecute an appeal from a
utility's initial decision, such a guarantee typically remains an empty
promise. The utilities, furthermore, have created broad and weighty
presumptions, based on certain indications of the user's income and
net worth, which lift the burden of proving creditworthiness from
some applicants and make it rest much heavier on others.50 One gas
company, for example, exempts homeowners and professionals unless
the company's previous experience with the particular customer shows
that he is a poor credit risk.0' Whether reliance on such crudely-defined
categories reflects a belief that some groups never default, a fear that
they would not tolerate the additional charge, or merely administrative
Home Tel. Co., 122 Vt. 50, 163 A.2d 838 (1960). Connecticut allows electric companies
to require any customer to deposit cash. Pub. Util. Regs. § 16-11-105(a) (1968).
Although tariff filings or commission regulations authorize deposits from any customer.
this does not mean that all utilities will demand deposits from everyone. In Vermont.
practices vary from charging deposits to all new customers, to charging only rental
customers, to charging according to credit ratings. Letter from Ernest Gibson HI. Chair-
man, Vermont Public Service Board, to Raymond P. Boulanger, Oct. 18. 1968.
49. E.g., N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs Regs. § 14:407-la; Ws. An.tiy. CODE § 134.06
(1)(a) (1966) (credit not established satisfactorily to utility); Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n.
Order No. 1692 (Rules for Electrical Service Revision of 1944) § la(a) (until a customer
shall have established a satisfactory credit rating).
Some regulations and utility rules establish categories of customers who have presumip-
tively established satisfactory credit. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., California, Rule No. 6 (1967)
((1) paid all bills within 12 consecutive months to this or other phone compan); (2)
owner of the premises or other local real estate; (3) continuously emplo)ed by present
employer for 2 or more years or retired and on pension).
The burden is usually upon the applicant to establish his credit, and the tariffs and
regulations do not generally prescribe how the applicant is to sustain this burden. E.g..
Washington Gas & Light Co., Gen. Serv. Provision, § 3; Potomac Elec. Co.. Washington.
D.C., § 4.
The New Jersey regulations simply allow credit to be established by "whatever method"
for telephone service. N.J. Dep't Pub. Util. Regs. § 14:707-1a. Northwestern Bell. Tel. Co..
Minn., Second Rev. Tariff Sheet, § 1 3(a) (1961), allows establishment of credit by furnish-
ing references acceptable to the utility.
50. See Complaint in Lewis v. Washington Gas Light Co., supra note 7; Complaint in
Nunemaker v. Pacific Tel. 9: Tel. Co., filed with the Public Utilities Commission of
California in 1967.
51. Interview with Mrs. Francis DeAngelis, Service Representative of Southern Con-
necticut Gas Company, New Haven, Oct. 25, 1968. Connecticut is one of the states which
allow the utilities to exact deposits from whomever it desires. The Gas Company has
adopted a narrower rule and relies on indicia of credit-ratings. See note 55 inlra.
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convenience,5 2 these criteria hardly isolate with any precision those cus-
tomers likely to default in payment of their utility bills. Even though
wealthier consumers may in fact default less often than others, their
number is not free of credit risks. Yet because of the deposit practices
of many utilities, bad risks in the higher income groups pay no deposits
while perfectly reliable users in lower-income must either deposit cash,
undertake the often difficult task of proving their creditworthiness,"
or do without the utility's service.
Even where the public utility does not employ broad presumptions,
but applies the satisfactory-credit standard in each individual case, it
may still create unjustified distinctions among its customers. If the util-
ity makes its own credit assessment, the discretion inherent in the very
general "creditworthiness" standard allows value judgments and pre-
judices to play their part in a credit rating. Moreover, the danger of
unreasonable discrimination still remains when the utility relies on an
outside credit check, such as the customer's general retail credit rating,
in applying a deposit requirement. Low-income consumers frequently
acquire poor credit ratings by refusing to complete payments on install-
ment purchases of defective or shoddy merchandise.
5 4 A bad credit rat-
ing earned in this way seems an inappropriate test to predict that a cus-
tomer will default on his utility bill.",
The possibility that public utilities may require deposits not for the
reasons they state, but to exploit their monopoly position,
50 sharpens
doubts that the requirement is reasonable and fair. Though utility
managements do not advertise the fact widely, they consider how much
52. The complaint in Lewis v. Washington Gas Light Co., note 7 supra, suggests that
the utility may use geographic-area credit ratings. Id. at 5. Questioned on this practice,
Kent H. Brown, counsel for the New York Public Service Commission, declared that there
has been no "evidence of an unduly discriminatory application of the requirement,
geographic, ethnic, or other. ... Letter from Kent H. Brown, Counsel for the New
York Public Service Commission, to Raymond P. Boulanger, Nov. 18, 1968. Of course,
many utilities probably do rely on actual credit-ratings. See letter of Ernest Gibson III,
note 48 supra, and interview with H. Loomis, note 8 supra.
53. Cf. D. CAPLOvrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE (1967).
54. In states which allow utilities to exact deposits from whomever it desires, the ap-
plicant for service must comply with the utility's demand for a deposit regardless of his
credit-rating. Here, the utility could avoid unreasonable discrimination by dcmanding
deposits on the same basis from everyone, though this practice might cast further doubt
on the reasonability of the tariff. Usually utility companies in these states apply the
same presumptive standards used elsewhere, which raises the same questions of arbitrary
discrimination.
55. For example, a person who has never borrowed from a reputable Institutional
lender, or maintained a charge account at a large store, may have difficulty establishing
that his credit is good.
56. Utilities are granted by franchise exclusive geographic areas in which they render
service. The competition they face may be only inter-industry competition. GARIELD 12.
458
Vol. 78: 448, 1969
Public Utilities and the Poor
consumers will pay as well as costs in pricing service. 57 To the extent
that regulatory commissions allow, utility companies attempt to charge
each identifiable group of customers according to the elasticity of its
demand for utility services. s The low-income consumers who generally
have to give deposits are also low-volume users with highly inelastic de-
mand curves. A utility can exact deposits from them with little fear
that they will turn to alternative servicesr0 or move to a neighborhood
where utility service does not have this added cost.00 Thus, low-income
users may pay more than their fair share of the cost of service0' while
other users such as affluent, high-volume residential customers pay
less.62 Required deposits constitute part of this overcharge, enabling
57. Bonbright identifies three concepts of value of service: (1) most profitable rate of
charge; (2) rate discrimination; and (3) market clearing price. J. Bomnsicirr, P.uNcWLEs
oF PUBLIc UTILITY RArEs 88-90 (1961) [hereinafter cited as BoNarnlurr]. Rate discrimina-
tion may serve justifiable purposes in an industry with decreasing average costs. It may
be socially desirable, for it can allow a company with excess capacity to expand sales
and utilize the facilities more fully, thereby spreading fixed costs and reducing prices
for all customers. PHILIPs 309. For discussion of pricing electric and gas utilities accord-
ing to elasticities, see C. WiLcox, PuBLIc PoLIciES TowARD BusINEss, 343-48 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as WiLcox].
58. At least in the literature of economics, the "value-of-service" principle is taken
most frequently to mean that principle of rate design under winch the difference
in the prices charged by a given enterprise for its various products are based, not
just on differences in the costs of production but also in part on differences in the
relative "price elasticities of demand." Products for which the demand will not be
seriously curtailed by relatively high prices will be made to bear these prices.
Products for which the demand will vanish or fade if the prices are set far above
out-of-pocket or marginal costs will be priced near to these costs.
BONBRIGHT 89.
For an exhaustive study of gas and electric pricing, see R.K. DAvmso.%, Paic Dis-
C UMNATION IN SELLING GAs AND ELEcTrcrry (1955), which outlines discrimination in-
herent in rate schedules as (1) peak-off-peak, (2) block-rate, and (3) class-rate. Id. 150-171.
59. Lmow-income consumers are often tenants, and so they may have especially inelastic
demand curves because of their reliance on the fixed investment of the landlord in
particular utility receiving equipment. Cf. BONBRIGHT 333 (discussion of changing elastici-
ties of demand curves in the short and long run).
60. Presumably higher income domestic consumers would not as easily be locked in
by their investment in utility receiving equipment, since they could either change services
or move. Cf. G. STIRiz, THE TnroRY OF PaicE 45 (rev. ed. 1952), for countervailing con-
siderations.
61. Wilcox concludes on this subject:
The commissions, moreover, have tended to favor discrimination where it has had
the effect of expanding consumption and bringing about a fuller utilization of
productive capacity. They have thus approved the creation of low-rate classes, tile
reduction of rates in successive quantity blocks, and the adoption of objective rate
plan. As a result, the wide differentials established between these classes have been
allowed to stand. In the case of electricity, particularly, the low rates go to big
business, where demand is elastic and where protection by government is not re-quired. The high rates go to small business and to householders, where demand is
inelastic and where such protection is really required. The law thus fails to give to
those who need it most the aid it was intended to provide.
WIVLcox 356.
62. The rather attractive cash promotional allowances granted to developers by gas
and electric utilities suggest that cost may not be covered by rates. In re Promotional
Practices of Electric and Gas Utilities, 65 P.U.R.3d 405 (1966) (Conn. P.S.C.). The Com-
mission reached a partial but not total satisfactory solution to this problem. It granted
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utilities to obtain cash for current needs at rates of interest that may
be substantially below market rates.
63 Therefore, if utilities are per-
mitted to exact deposits at all, the deposit requirement should be lim-
ited closely to cases where the possibility of default on the utility bill
can be demonstrated to be real. In practice, this standard probably
means that deposits should be required only when the customer has
previously defaulted unjustifiably on a bill issued by the utility com-
pany itself or by another utility offering similar service in another
locality.
III. Conclusion
Facts which would show whether utility deposits fulfill their stated
purposes or some other objective, or whether the criteria for requiring
deposits unreasonably and unfairly discriminate against low-income
users, are peculiarly within the control of the public utilities them-
selves. 64 Complainants who must produce at least part of this evidence
the allowance on the condition that the utilities file descriptions of their promotional
practices in the future.
63. Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright observed in a speech delivered to the Briefing Con.
ference sponsored by the Federal Bar Association in Washington, D.C., on December -1,
1968, that "[a]nother area in which the poor may be subsidizing the rich is the require-
ment of many power companies that some consumers put up deposits before they can
get service." Whether utilities can take advantage of consumer deposits seems to depend
on their ability to incorporate these deposits into the rate base through some accounting
manipulation. Ordinarily, consumer deposits are not included in the rate base. GARFIELD
71-72. Nevertheless, it does seem possible for utilities to include them. Because some
provisions are provided for working capital in the rate base, the utilities may be able
to forego some borrowing in the capital market or divert retained earnings to other
projects and rely on consumer deposits to supply it with working capital. For a brief
discussion of the inclusion of working capital into the rate base, see GARFIELD 71, and
see Re Southern California Gas Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 300, 316-17 (1968) (Cal. P.S.C.), for an
example of the computation of working capital credited to the rate base. The utility
could then capture the difference in interest rates between those available in the market
and those paid to consumers.
Most commissions require utilities to pay four to six per cent on cash deposit, see note
12 supra, while current interest rates in the long-term capital market have been con-
siderably higher. (Yields on triple-A utility bonds peaked at about 6.7 per cent in the
spring of 1968, declined after the surtax passed by Congress, but have been edging up
again. On October 7, 1968, Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland sold
S75 million of triple-A debentures priced to yield 6.60 per cent. Allan, Money Rates
Pushing Up Again, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1968, § 3, at 1.)
Of course, a comparison of nominal interest rates is unrewarding. Certainly, the cost
of supervising consumer deposits may raise nominal rates of 4-6 per cent to much higher
levels. On the other hand, financing by debt capital can be extremely costly as tile per.
centage of outstanding debt to equity capital increases. Though customer deposits may
be insignificant when viewed in relation to annual revenues, they may assume large
absolute values. In 1967, the Southern New England Telephone Company had $6,216,000
credited to customer accounts, although it is unclear how much of this was for line
extensions rather than credit deposits. MOODY'S PuBLIC UTILITY MANUAL 1410 (Aug. 1968).
64. As to the electric and gas utilities at the present time, the deficiencies and
460
Vol. 78: 448, 1969
Public Utilities and the Poor
in order to challenge a deposit rule sucessfully face an all but insur-
mountable obstacle. Nonetheless, commissions and courts have uni-
formly declared that complainant has the burden of proving that a
commission regulation previously approved or a utility rule previously
filed with the commission violates a statutory provision.65 This hard-
and-fast placement of the burden of proof rests on the justification that
any other rule would expose the utilities to continual harassment by
irate customers.66 Plainly enough, however, courts can fashion more
flexible rules which would neither inflict endless litigation upon the
utilities nor foreclose the possibility of effective consumer-initiated
challenges to deposit requirements. In cases where the regulatory com-
mission has approved a deposit requirement without close inquiry into
its reasonableness and fairness, 7 or where there has been no recent
re-examination of the utility's rules and practices, the court or commis-
sion should place the initial burden of producing evidence on the util-
ity.68 Perhaps the utility should also bear the burden of demonstrating
paucity of published cost analyses make it impossible to determine the effect of
"value-of-service" principles on typical rate structures.
BON-RIGHT 184.
Although uniform systems of accounts control the accounting practices of utilities,
these would not provide sufficient cost data to undertake a study of deposit practices.
See PHIr.LIps, 149-60 for a discussion of accounting systems.
65. Antioch Milling Co. v. Public Serv. Co. of Northern Ill., 4 I1. 2d 200, 209. 123
N.E.2d 302, 307 (1954); City of Terre Haute v. Terre Haute Water Works Corp., 180
N.E.2d 110, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 1962) (that rate structure had been in effect without com-
plaint was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of reasonableness as between class"
of customers); California State Hotel Ass'n, Ltd. v. California Interstate Tel. Co.. 28
P.U.R.3d 196 (1959) (Cal. P.U.C.). State ex rel. Model Water & Light Co. v. Department
of Pub. Serv. of Wash., 199 Wash 24, 35, 90 P.2d 243. 248 (1939). But cf. Parrectt v. United
Natural Gas Co., 42 P.U.R. (n.s.) 296 (1942) (Pa. P.U.C.).
66. "Certainly as a practical matter a utility should not, in the absence of explicit
legislative direction, be required to embark upon a full dress justification of its rate
structure every time an individual customer files a complaint." Antioch Milling Co. v.
Public Serv. Co. of Northern Ill., 4 Ill. 2d 200, 209, 123 N.E.2d 302. 307 (1954). See also
Carpenter v. Home Tel. Co., 122 Vt. 50, 163 A.2d 838, 842 (1960).
67. Perhaps data has been presented to commissions informally or in hearings which
have not been challenged and unreported. But in the formal adversary hearings which
have been reported, the inquiry has seemed to extend only to an analysis that uncollected
bills are outstanding. See Manhattan Reporting Bureau, Inc. v. New York Tel. Co.. 1926B
P.U.R. 1 (1926) (N.Y. P.S.C.), which stated only that the telephone company had S793.000
in uncollected telephone bills. No further analysis of these uncolleCtibles was attempted.
See also Re Southern Counties Gas Co. of Cal., 7 P.U.R.3d 267 (1957) (Cal. P.U.C.).
Only limited inquiry has been made into the practice of including an allowance fat
uncollectibles in the determination of rates. Re Southern Cal. Gas Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 300
(1960) (Cal. P.U.C.) (percentage factor of 0.42 per cent of the estimated finn service
revenues for the test year); Public Util. Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 413
(1959) (Pa. P.U.C.) (a factor of .004 per cent in revenue increase). See Re Central Wis.
consin Gas Co., 3 P.U.R.3d 65 (1954) (Wis. P.S.C.) for a discussion of accounting practices
relating to accumulating reserves against bad debts.
68. While the complainant attacking the commission regulation or utility tariff gen-
erally has the burden of proving that such regulation or tariff is unlawful, see notes
65-66 supra, creative interpretation of state statutes may provide opportunities for the
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the lawfulness of the requirement if its deposit rules became effective
without any commission hearing at all-as with deposit rules which
arose under the common law and were later accepted without investi-
gation by the commissions.6 9
Lying behind these questions, and lending them special significance,
are serious constitutional problems of due process and equal protec-
tion. Though some courts have failed to see "state action" in the filing
and approval of a utility tariff,70 state regulation and supervision of
public utilities constitute sufficient intervention to cloak a deposit
requirement with governmental authority.71 The Supreme Court has
held that economic status cannot be the basis for distributing certain
important state-created benefits, despite compelling practical reasons
for conditioning the right to such benefits on an ability to pay. 2 Thus,
complainant to shift the burden back to the utility. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-23 (1949)
provides:
All regulations, practices and service prescribed by the commission shall be in
force and prima facie reasonable, unless suspended or found otherwise in an action
brought for that purpose or until changed or modified by the commission.
While the statute and cases do not clearly indicate who must sustain the burden of proof
when the commission initiates an inquiry, in practice the commission must shift the
burden to the utility or treat the burden of proof requirement as non-existent (or at the
least unimportant).
The Illinois Commerce Commission has been authorized to place the burden on tile
utility to justify its practices where the commission initiates an inquiry. The court
relied on an apparent misreading of a statute relating to the valuation of pro erty and
may merely have intended to allow the commission to place the burden on tic utility
where it had not sustained the burden previously. See City of Chicago v. Commerce
Comm'n, 13 111. 2d 607, 617, 170 N.E.2d 776 (1958), where ILL. Rv. STAT., cl. 111 2/3,
§ 30 (1950), is cited as the basis for the shifting of the burden of proof.
It seems but a slight extension of the above argument for the commission, in a proper
case, to require the utility to sustain the burden of proof despite the fact that the
proceedings against the utility have been filed by a group of private citizens. But see
Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n v. Department of Pub. Util., 352 Mass. 18, 224 N.E.2d 502
(1967).
69. See note 67 supra.
70. Sokol v. Public Util. Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d 247, 53 Cal. Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265
(1966) (by implication); Taglianetti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 R.I. 351, 103
A.2d 67 (1954).
71. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Cf. Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
72. In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the Supreme Court
held that "a state violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard."
Id. at 666.
One may argue that the payment of a poll tax reflects or even fosters interest in the
political process. But these or similar arguments are in this case irrelevant to an analysis
of the equal protection clause. Because suffrage is conceived as a fundamental right, the
state cannot "dilute a citizen's vote on account of his economic status." Id. at 668.
The Supreme Court has not limited its protection of rights to those drawn from the
Constitution. The Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (free criminal
trial transcript or equivalent), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (provision
of free counsel on first criminal appellate level), indicated that if the Constitution does
not require a certain right such as appellate review of criminal proceedings, but the
state chooses to provide that right, it cannot erect barriers which "discriminate on ac.
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when a state creates a right in its citizens to receive utility services at
reasonable charges and on reasonable, non-discriminatory terms, there
is considerable doubt that it can permit utility companies to demand an
unreasonable tribute from one class of consumers simply because they
are poor. The right to public utility services may not rank with the
franchise, or with procedural due process in criminal cases, on a con-
ventional scale of liberties, but to the poor nothing may be more im-
mediately important than fair treatment by those who supply the needs
of their daily existence. 3
count of poverty ...." 351 US. at 17. If a right such as appellate reviciv in criminal
cases is to exist, it must be provided to all regardless of economic status. It must be
admitted that the Court in Griffin and Douglas may have been groping for a due process
rationale. See the dissent of Justice Harlan in Douglas, 372 U.S. at 360.
See also Comment, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and Its
Progeny, 16 STAN. L. REv. 394 (1964). The commentator declared that "the court has in
fact found state action to violate the equal protection clause wherc upon balance the
good or benefit reasonably to be accomplished for society fails to outweigh the harm
or deprivation imposed on those unfavorably classified." Id. 399. It is indeed questionable
whether the costs imposed upon the utility exceed the human costs involved in the
deprivation of service.
73. The Kerner Report states that "it is clear that many residents of disadvantaged
Negro neighborhoods believe they suffer constant abuses by local merchants." Tun
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvIsoRY COstssISSrON ON CtvtL DisoRDEs 274 (Bantam ed. 1963).
While these grievances may have been over-shadowed by criticisms of police practices.
employment opportunities, and housing, abuse of commercial practices did rank fourth
in the scale of grievances in two dties. Id. at 196 n.229.
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